

## Message Text

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SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE  
SAHARA

REF: USNATO 0392

1. AS REQUESTED IN REFTTEL THERE FOLLOWS THE TABLE OF  
CONTENTS AND TEXT, WITH NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS, OF THE  
DEPARTMENT'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE REPORT OF THE EXPERTS  
ON THE SITUATION IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA.

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3. TEXT.

I. SOUTHERN AFRICA

RHODESIA

(1) DOMESTIC SITUATION. FOLLOWING SMITH'S  
SEPTEMBER ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE

FOR MAJORITY AFRICAN RULE ON THE BASIS OF THE US-UK FORMULA PRESENTED AT PRETORIA, RHODESIANS WERE ALTERNATIVELY HOPEFUL, FEARFUL AND ALMOST ALWAYS CONFUSED. WHITE EMIGRATION INCREASED, THE ALREADY FRAGILE ECONOMY BARELY RESPONDED TO EXPECTATIONS OF AN END TO SANCTIONS AND REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION BOYCOTTS, AND THE PERVERSIVE QUESTION: "WHY FIGHT AND DIE IF A SETTLEMENT IS AT

HAND?" AFFECTED MORALE BOTH IN THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY WHITE AND BLACK POPULATIONS. BUT AS NATIONALIST DEMANDS BECAME MORE EXTREME, THE RHODESIANS BEGAN TO DOUBT IF AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES RESULTED IN JANUARY IN SMITH'S REJECTION OF THE LATEST BRITISH PROPOSALS. SMITH PROBABLY WAS REFLECTING THE WILL NOT ONLY OF THE RHODESIAN FRONT BUT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE WHITE POPULATION.

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(2) THE RHODESIANS ARE NOW GIRDING FOR ALL-OUT WAR. AT THE SAME TIME, SMITH IS APPARENTLY PREPARING FOR A UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRETORIA AGREEMENT TO BRING RHODESIA TO MAJORITY RULE WITH "LOYAL" BLACK RHODESIANS AND POSSIBLY THE MUZOREWA FACTION OF THE NATIONALISTS, IF THE LATTER WILL ACCEPT A ROLE IN AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. MEANWHILE, THE RHODESIANS APPEAR CAPABLE OF HOLDING OFF THE GUERRILLAS FOR THE TIME BEING, AND HAVE DEALT SERIOUS BLOWS TO THEIR FORCES (AND FRELIMO TROOPS) IN MOZAMBIQUE.

(3) NEGOTIATIONS. THE ISSUES UPON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS FOUNDERED IN JANUARY WERE:

--WHITE REPRESENTATION IN THE RULING MINISTERIAL COUNCIL WHICH, IN SPITE OF THE CHECKING POWER OF A POSSIBLE BRITISH VETO, THE RHODESIANS FELT WAS NUMERICALLY INADEQUATE TO PROTECT WHITE SECURITY AND INTERESTS. THEY APPARENTLY WERE NOT CONVINCED THAT THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE IN SALISBURY WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT POWER TO DO SO;

--CONTROL OF THE SECURITY FORCES WHETHER BY THE SMITH REGIME; BY A NEUTRAL, BRITISH-DOMINATED BODY; OR AT LEAST PARTIALLY BY THE NATIONALISTS. THE RHODESIANS WERE UNWILLING TO ABDICATE THIS CRUCIAL POWER, NOR WOULD THEY ACCEPT THE NEED TO INTEGRATE GUERRILLAS INTO THE ARMED FORCES.

(4) IN A NUTSHELL, THE CONFERENCE SUCCUMBED TO THE INABILITY TO RESOLVE THE BASIC ISSUE DIVIDING THE TWO

SIDES. THE AFRICANS DEMANDED THAT THE PROCESS OF  
DEVOLVING POWER TO THEM BE IRREVERSIBLE. THE WHITES  
WANTED TO BE ABLE TO CALL A HALT TO THE PROCESS IF IT  
BECAME DISORDERLY, THREATENED THEIR SECURITY AND ECONOMIC  
INTERESTS, AND APPEARED DOOMED TO FALL INTO THE HANDS  
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OF THE MOST RADICAL NATIONALISTS, E.G., MUGABE AND  
ZIPA.

(5) ATTITUDES OF NEIGHBORING STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

THE NEIGHBORING AFRICAN STATES HAVE TAKEN SMITH'S RE-  
JECTION OF THE BRITISH PLAN AS A SIGNAL TO REVERT TO ALL-  
OUT GUERRILLA WARFARE. EVEN THE MORE MODERATE KAUNDA  
HAS ANNOUNCED HIS COMMITMENT TO ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT  
FOR THE GUERRILLAS AND THE "WAR OPTION." SOUTH AFRICA,  
IN TURN, WHILE PROBABLY DISPLEASED BY THE ABRUPT END OF  
THE PROCESSES ESTABLISHED AT GENEVA, APPEARS TO BE  
WILLING TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING THE SMITH REGIME BOTH  
MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST.

(6) THE SOVIET UNION HAS SO FAR REACTED CAUTIOUSLY TO  
THE STALEMATE IN THE GENEVA TALKS, PROBABLY REFLECTING  
SOVIET UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE DIRECTION IN WHICH EVENTS  
WILL NOW MOVE. PUBLICLY, THEY HAVE LARGELY FOLLOWED  
THE LEAD OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. THE VITRIOLIC SOVIET  
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST US EFFORTS TO HELP SOLVE  
THE CRISIS HAVE DIMINISHED SOMEWHAT, BUT THE UNHELPFUL  
SOVIET SNIPING AT "NEO-COLONIALIST" PROPOSALS TO SETTLE  
THE CONFLICT PERSISTS.

(7) THE USSR HAS CONTINUED TO ARM THE GUERRILLAS THROUGH  
THE FRONT-LINE STATES, AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO KEEP ON  
DOING SO. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET SUPPLY  
EFFORT HAS INCREASED SOMEWHAT RECENTLY, ALTHOUGH THE  
LEVEL OF SUPPORT HAS APPARENTLY NOT ESCALATED DRAMATICAL-  
LY. THE USSR'S ABILITY TO BRING DIRECT INFLUENCE TO  
BEAR ON THE GUERRILLAS, MEANWHILE, IS CIRCUMSCRIBED BY  
THE FRONT-LINE STATES AND BY MOSCOW'S OWN UNCERTAINTY  
ABOUT THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE VARIOUS RIVAL FACTIONS  
WITHIN THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT.

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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

(8) INTERNAL. DESPITE UNPRECEDENTED INTERNAL TURBULENCE AND MUCH TALK OF "CHANGE," SOUTH AFRICA'S GOVERNMENT GIVES LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT IT IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY BASIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM. THE RIOTING, WHICH ERUPTED LAST JUNE AND CONTINUED FOR SIX MONTHS IN THE BLACK AND COLORED TOWNSHIPS OUTSIDE JOHANNESBURG AND CAPE TOWN INTRODUCED A SCALE OF URBAN POLITICAL PROTEST, BOTH IN EXTENT AND DURATION, WHICH WAS PHENOMENAL IN THE FACE OF THE MASSIVE FORCE OF THE GOVERNMENT. IT CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE RELATIVE INEFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK POLITICAL GROUPS SINCE THE GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN OF THE EARLY 1960S.

(9) THE GOVERNMENT REACTED WITH HARSH POLICE REPRESSION. KNOWN AND SUSPECTED STUDENT LEADERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED,

OFTEN WITHOUT CHARGE, OR BANNED. THE FIRST OF MANY POLITICAL TRIALS STEMMING FROM LAST YEAR'S RIOTS ARE JUST GETTING UNDER WAY. ALTHOUGH THE DISTURBANCES HAVE SO FAR BEEN HANDLED BY THE POLICE WITHOUT RECOURSE TO THE MILITARY, THE GOVERNMENT HAS JUST ASKED PARLIAMENT FOR NEW EMERGENCY POWERS INCLUDING CONTINGENCY AUTHORIZATION TO EXPAND MILITARY TOURS OF DUTY AND TO IMPOSE CENSORSHIP.

(10) MUCH IS STILL UNCLEAR ABOUT THE DISORDERS, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RIOTING WAS PLANNED OR SPONTANEOUS. THEY SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT A NEW YOUTHFUL RADICALIZED GENERATION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP HAS EMERGED. IN CONTRAST TO THEIR ELDERS, THEY DEMAND NOT ONLY A BETTER DEAL IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TERMS, BUT ALSO POLITICAL RIGHTS, AND A SHARE IN OR EVEN PERHAPS EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF THE SYSTEM.

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(11) OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE NEW MILITANTS IS INCOMPLETE. THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD OLDER POLITICAL GROUPS SUCH AS THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS APPEAR TO BE AMBIVALENT. WHETHER THEY WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN ORGANIZATIONAL COHESION AND SIGNIFICANT RESISTANCE IN THE FACE OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE HARASSMENT IS UNCLEAR. THE EVIDENCE IS THAT THEY ARE SEARCHING FOR NEW METHODS OF STRUGGLE. SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES RECENTLY HAVE DISCOVERED EXPLOSIVES CACHES, AND A LARGE NUMBER OF YOUTHS REPORTEDLY ARE SEEKING GUERRILLA TRAINING OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY.

(12) DESPITE THE RECENTLY INTERRUPTED LULL IN DISORDER IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT A NEW AND PERMANENT MILITANCY HAS BEEN BORN, WHICH COULD PRESAGE A BROAD RESURGENCE OF BLACK POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THE OLD-LINE BANNED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (ANC AND PAC) ARE TRYING TO CAPITALIZE ON THE NEW WAVE BY RECRUITING THE NEW MILITANT YOUTH WHO HAVE FLED THE COUNTRY.

(13) ADULT BLACK LEADERS HAVE BECOME MORE MILITANT AS WELL. GATSHA BUTHELEZI, WHOSE OPPOSITION HAS BEEN TOLERATED BY THE REGIME BECAUSE HE OPERATED WITHIN THE SYSTEM, HAS ADOPTED A MORE MILITANT STANCE AND NEW BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS RHETORIC IN AN EFFORT TO BOLSTER HIS CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR THE COUNTRY'S URBAN BLACKS. URBAN ADULT "MODERATES" HAVE MOVED CLOSER TO BLACK POWER ADVOCATES TO FORM THE BLACK PARENTS ASSOCIATION AND MANY HAVE BEEN DETAINED OR BANNED IN CONSEQUENCE.

(14) SOUTH AFRICAN WHITES, EVEN SOME AFRIKANERS, FEEL A GROWING CONCERN AND A REALIZATION THAT SOMETHING DIFFERENT MUST BE DONE. BUT THERE APPEARS TO BE NO SERIOUS PRES-SURES FROM THE NP'S AFRIKANER STRONGHOLDS FOR CHANGES  
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IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT. VORSTER HAS REJECTED BLACK AND LIBERAL WHITE CALLS FOR A NATIONAL CONVENTION OF ALL RACES TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL FUTURE AND CONTINUES TO MOVE FIRMLY ON THE HOMELANDS PROGRAM. THE TRANSKEI BECAME THE FIRST HOMELAND TO BE GRANTED INDEPENDENCE IN OCTOBER AND BOPHUTHATSWANA--"CONSOLIDATED" INTO SIX PIECES SPREAD ACROSS THREE PROVINCES--IS SCHEDULED TO DO THE SAME IN DECEMBER.

(15) NAMIBIA. A SMALL WORKING GROUP OF THE WINDHOEK CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IS MAKING RAPID PROGRESS ON A DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR A PROJECTED MULTIRACIAL INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN NAMIBIA, AND THE TARGET DATE OF JULY 1977 FOR ITS ESTABLISHMENT APPARENTLY STILL STANDS. BUT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW STATE OR ON THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH IS TO PRECEDE IT.

(16) PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DETERMINING THIS ISSUE IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOUTH AFRICA WILL RESPECT THE VIEWS OF NAMIBIA'S WHITE CONSERVATIVES. THE CONSERVATIVES STILL DESIRE WHITE CONTROL IN NAMIBIA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. SO THEY WANT AGREEMENT THAT THE NEW STATE WILL HAVE A "TIER" SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WITH POWER IN THE SECOND TIER OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS COR-

RESPONDING TO THE PRESENT ETHNIC "HOMELANDS," AS WELL AS GUARANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS, PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND PRESERVATION OF THEIR CULTURAL IDENTITY BEFORE ANY POWERS ARE RELINQUISHED. SOME OF THE WHITES, HOWEVER, NOW RECOGNIZE THAT THE CURRENT SET-UP IS NO LONGER VIABLE IN TERMS OF THEIR DESIRE TO REMAIN IN THE TERRITORY. THEY ARE WILLING TO SHARE POWER NOW, UNDER CERTAIN GUARANTEES. THESE WHITES AND MOST OF THE BLACK DELEGATIONS WANT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE POWER CONCENTRATED IN THE "FIRST TIER" OR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, IN WHICH ALL  
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RACES WOULD PARTICIPATE.

(17) ANOTHER KEY ISSUE IN NAMIBIA'S TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE IS THE PARTICIPATION OF SWAPO IN THE PROCESS. RECOGNIZED BY THE OAU AS THE SOLE NAMIBIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, AND WITH SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT INSIDE NAMIBIA, SWAPO IS NOT EVEN REPRESENTED AT THE WINDHOEK CONFERENCE. IT CLAIMS, HOWEVER, TO BE THE ONLY VALID INTERLOCUTOR FOR SOUTH AFRICA IN NEGOTIATING NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE. IT REJECTS PARTICIPATION IN THE WINDHOEK TALKS, CHARGING THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S INTENTION IS TO IMPOSE PUPPET REGIMES IN THE HOMELANDS, AND THUS EFFECTIVELY MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO.

(18) SOME MEMBERS OF SWAPO'S INTERNAL BRANCH WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO MODIFY THIS RIGID ATTITUDE TOWARD THE TALKS. SWAPO PRESIDENT NUJOMA PROPOSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE UN ORGANIZE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SWAPO AND SOUTH AFRICA INSTEAD, WITH THE WINDHOEK DELEGATES INCLUDED IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION. HE ALSO INSISTS THAT SOUTH AFRICA FIRST RELEASE NAMIBIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS AND MAKE A COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW ITS MILITARY FORCES.

(19) SWAPO IS ANATHEMA TO VORSTER AND TO NAMIBIA'S WHITE CONSERVATIVES, BUT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT SUCH VIEWS MAY NO LONGER BE SHARED BY MANY NAMIBIAN WHITES, WHO RECOGNIZE THAT SWAPO CANNOT BE IGNORED IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION. THE BLACK DELEGATES ARE PROBABLY ALSO DIVIDED.

(20) IT IS NOT YET CLEAR HOW THE PROJECTED CONSTITUTION WILL DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS, OR WHETHER THE CURRENT DRAFT WILL SAIL INTACT THROUGH THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT AS ITS FREQUENTLY OVER-OPTIMISTIC ARCHITECT, DIRK MUDGE, PREDICTS. MANY OF THE BLACKS WHO ARE NOT REPRESENTED IN  
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THE TURNHALLE TALKS SUPPORT SWAPO, AND MORE SUPPORT THE PARTICIPATION OF SWAPO AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE PROCESS. IF THE WINDHOEK CONFERENCE FOUNDERS AGAIN ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, THE PARTIES AND EVEN SOME OF THE DELEGATES MAY RALLY TO SWAPO IN FRUSTRATION. IF, HOWEVER, ENOUGH PROGRESS THERE IS PERCEIVED BY SWAPO, IT MAY YET MODIFY ITS INTRANSIGENCE.

(21) RELATIONS WITH AFRICA. THE OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS OF VORSTER'S DISCREDITED DETENTE POLICY PRESUMABLY REMAIN VALID:

--TO DEFUSE REGIONAL TENSIONS AND RETARD BLACK AFRICAN PRESSURES FOR CHANGE INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA BY FACILITATING TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA AND BEING ACCOMMODATING ON NAMIBIA--OR APPEARING TO BE SO--WHILE MOVING THE HOMELANDS STRUCTURE TO THE POINT OF IRREVERSIBILITY.

--TO PERSUADE BLACK AFRICAN STATES TO THE NORTH THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA ARE SO IMPORTANT TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY AS TO OUTWEIGH POLITICAL DIFFERENCES.

(22) THE AFRICAN REACTION TO VORSTER'S OUTWARD INITIATIVES REMAINS AMBIVALENT. ON THE ONE HAND, VORSTER PROBABLY COULD BE THE DECISIVE INFLUENCE IN SETTLING BOTH THE RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIAN PROBLEMS. SINCE HE CONTROLS SMITH'S SUPPLY LINES, HE HOLDS THE TRUMP CARD IN RHODESIA, AND COULD PROBABLY FORCE SMITH TO AN AGREEMENT IF HE CHOSE TO DO SO. IN NAMIBIA VORSTER HOLDS THE KEY TO A SETTLEMENT EVEN MORE DIRECTLY.

(23) ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ERUPTION OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICAN PROTEST AND PRETORIA'S ZIG-ZAGGING ON NAMIBIA HAVE WEIGHED THE SCALES MORE HEAVILY AGAINST HIM. THE AFRICANS DISTRUST HIM AS MUCH AS EVER--IF NOT MORE. THEY

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HAVE NOT BEEN TOO CAREFUL TO CONCEAL THEIR FEELING THAT ONCE RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA ARE DISPOSED OF, "SOUTH AFRICA IS NEXT."

(24) THUS, PRETORIA'S REGIONAL POLICY IS IN DISARRAY.

--IT CANNOT CONVINCE THE BLACK STATES TO THE NORTH THAT



THEY HAVE COMMON INTERESTS WITH THE REPUBLIC AS IT PRESENTLY EXISTS, EXCEPT FOR THE MOST LIMITED TACTICAL PURPOSES.

--THE RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATIONS ARE RISKY ENTERPRISES, EVEN IF THEY SUCCEED, SINCE PRETORIA CANNOT REALLY BE CERTAIN THAT THE EVENTUAL OUTCOMES WILL BE TO ITS LIKING.

--THE OLD NIGHTMARE OF A COMMUNIST MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA HAS BECOME REAL.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS ACCUMULATION OF PROBLEMS HAS THREATENED VORSTER'S AUTHORITY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY FIELD, BUT IT HAS PRODUCED WIDESPREAD DISQUIET AND A DEBATE WITHIN THE GOVERNING ESTABLISHMENT.

(25) RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE. THE INTERNAL SITUATION HAS CREATED PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE WEST. SOUTH AFRICAN WHITES GENERALLY VIEW THE WORLD AS CONSISTING OF TWO CAMPS--MONOLITHIC COMMUNISM AND THE FREE WORLD--LOCKED IN MORTAL COMBAT WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON THE FRONT LINE. BUT THE RIOTING AND THE RESULTING REPRESSION HAVE SERIOUSLY ERODED GOOD WILL IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, AND INCREASED THE RELUCTANCE OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO BE SEEN AS SOUTH AFRICA'S FRIEND, ECONOMIC PARTNER OR ARMS SUPPLIER. AN IMPORTANT REASON FOR SOUTH AFRICAN WILLINGNESS TO PRESS SMITH TO ACCEPT THE KISSINGER PROPOSALS WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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PROBABLY PRETORIA'S HOPE THAT COOPERATION WOULD RESUSCITATE WESTERN GOOD WILL. BUT IN JANUARY, THE LOSS OF SUCH HOPE WAS EVIDENT IN VORSTER'S GRIM MESSAGE TO HIS PEOPLE THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HAVE TO GO IT ALONE, SINCE IT COULD COUNT ON NO ONE BUT ITSELF TO WITHSTAND THE IMPENDING COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT. THIS PESSIMISTIC VIEW WAS PROBABLY DUE TO THE INCREASINGLY DISTANT ATTITUDE OF SOME ERSTWHILE FRIENDS, DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE DIRECTION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON RHODESIA UNDER BRITISH LEADERSHIP AND ANTICIPATION OF A MORE HOSTILE ATTITUDE FROM THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION.

ANGOLA

(26) DOMESTIC SITUATION. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA (PRA) REMAINS UNABLE TO QUELL THE THREE INSURGENT MOVEMENTS WHICH HAVE CHALLENGED ITS AUTHORITY. THE PRA HAS UNDISPUTED CONTROL ONLY OF THE MAJOR CITIES AND PARTS

OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN ANGOLA. TRAVEL BEYOND THESE AREAS IS DANGEROUS AND SUBJECT TO GUERRILLA HARASSMENT. THE CONTINUED CLOSURE OF THE BENGUELA RAILWAY BECAUSE OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY REMAINS A CONSPICUOUS EMBARRASSMENT FOR THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT.

(27) WHILE THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE INSURGENTS DOES NOT THREATEN THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUED EXISTENCE, THE CONTINUING POLITICAL INSTABILITY HAS ADDED TO THE COUNTRY'S DIFFICULT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS:

--LUANDA AND OTHER CITIES ARE EXPERIENCEING SEVERE FOOD AND OTHER SHORTAGES.

--DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS ARE DEVELOPING WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES AND CRIME INCREASING AMONG CIVILIANS.

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--THE SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF TRAINED PERSONNEL IS CONTINUING.

--RACIAL TENSIONS ARE INCREASING AS SOME BLACK EXTREMISTS TRY TO INTIMIDATE WHITES AND MULATTOS.

(28) ANGOLAN PRESIDENT NETO'S POSITION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BOLSTERED BY A NOVEMBER GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION WHICH REMOVED THE MORE RADICAL, ANTI-WESTERN NITO ALVES FROM HIS CABINET POSITION. NETO SUPPORTERS ASSUMED A LARGE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT AND PARTY PORTFOLIOS AND NETO HIMSELF REPLACED ALVES AS INTERIOR MINISTER.

(29) DEPENDENCE UPON THE CUBANS. THE PRA REMAINS HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON THE PRESENCE OF SOME 10-15,000 CUBAN SOLDIERS. THEIR LACK OF SUCCESS AGAINST THE INSURGENTS HAS APPARENTLY HALTED THE GRADUAL TROOP REDUCTIONS BEGUN EARLY LAST YEAR. ALTHOUGH TROOP ROTATIONS ARE PROBABLY OCCURRING, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CUBANS IN ANGOLA HAS APPARENTLY REMAINED FAIRLY CONSTANT FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS. CUBAN AND ANGOLAN LEADERS NOW SAY THAT THE CUBAN FORCE WILL REMAIN IN ANGOLA AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO INSURE THE STABILITY OF THE ANGOLAN REGIME. IN ADDITION TO THE MILITARY UNITS, SOME CUBAN ADVISERS AND TECHNICIANS ARE ALSO ASSIGNED TO THE COUNTRY.

(30) IN SPITE OF PRA'S EVIDENT NEED FOR THE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE, FRICTION BETWEEN THE CUBANS AND ORDINARY ANGOLANS IS GROWING. SOME ANGOLANS CHARGE THAT THE CUBANS ARE BEHAVING LIKE COLONIALISTS: EXHIBITING ATTI-

TUDES OF SUPERIORITY AND ENJOYING CONSPICUOUSLY HIGH STANDARDS OF LIVING WHILE ANGOLANS EXPERIENCE SHORTAGES. THE CUBANS CLAIM THAT MOST ANGOLANS HAVE UNDISCIPLINED WORK HABITS AND LEARN SLOWLY. CUBANS BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE SINGLED OUT AS TARGETS FOR GUERRILLA ACTIONS AND  
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SUFFER UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES. THEY HAVE SHOWN A RELUCTANCE TO FIGHT AGGRESSIVELY.

(31) RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS. IN ADDITION TO CUBAN TROOPS THE PRA NEEDS SOVIET ARMS AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. SIGNATURE OF THE SOVIET-ANGOLAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY AND CPSU-MPLA COOPERATION AGREEMENT DURING PRESIDENT NETO'S VISIT TO THE USSR IN OCTOBER CAPPED THE PROCESS OF FORMALIZING SOVIET-ANGOLAN TIES AND PUT A SOVIET IMPRIMATUR ON THE NETO REGIME. WITHOUT MENTIONING SPECIFICS THE TREATY PROVIDED, INTER ALIA, FOR THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF MUTUAL MILITARY COOPERATION. THIS REFERENCE MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS OBLIGATING ANGOLA TO ASSIST THE SOVIET DEFENSE CAPABILITY, POSSIBLY BY PROVIDING MILITARY FACILITIES. THE CONTINUATION OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MPLA AND THE DETERIORATING ANGOLAN ECONOMIC SITUATION MUST, HOWEVER, TROUBLE MOSCOW WHICH IS NOT LIKELY TO RELISH THE PROSPECT OF INCREASING REQUESTS FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM LUANDA.

(32) FOREIGN POLICY. DESPITE THE PRA'S GROWING TIES TO CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS PROCLAIMED MARXIST-LENINIST ORIENTATION, ANGOLAN LEADERS CLAIM TO BE NON-ALIGNED. ALTHOUGH NETO'S PUBLIC SPEECHES ARE EFFUSIVE IN PRAISE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA, AND IN CONDEMNATION OF WESTERN IMPERIALISTS, NETO ALSO STRESSES ANGOLA'S READINESS TO ESTABLISH TRADE AND DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH ALL

STATES. THIS MAY BE INTERPRETED AS A DESIRE TO BALANCE ITS RELIANCE UPON COMMUNIST NATIONS WITH BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

(33) IT REMAINS UNCOMPROMISING TOWARD ITS DOMESTIC OPPONENTS AND IS PREPARED TO PRESSURE ITS MODERATE NEIGHBORS, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC OR OTHER MEANS, INTO REDUCING OR ABANDONING THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS.  
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MOZAMBIQUE

(34) DOMESTIC SITUATION. PRESIDENT SAMORA MACHEL REMAINS THE UNDISPUTED LEADER OF MOZAMBIQUE; AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, THE ARMY, AND THE RULING PARTY, FRELIMO, HE WIELDS ENORMOUS POWER. HE LEANS HEAVILY UPON A SMALL GROUP OF MARXIST-ORIENTED GOANS AND MULATTOES IN FORMULATING POLICY BUT NONE OF HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES HAVE THE PERSONAL FOLLOWING, POWER BASE, OR CHARISMA TO SERIOUSLY CHALLENGE HIM. FRELIMO VICE PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS HOLDS A STRONG POSITION WITHIN THE PARTY BUT LACKS A MILITARY AND REGIONAL POWER BASE. MINISTER OF INTERIOR GUEBUZA, WHO HAS EMERGED AS THE NUMBER THREE MAN IN THE PARTY, IS AGGRESSIVE AND CUNNING AND HAS CONTROL OVER THE POLICE, BUT AS YET APPEARS TO HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE IN THE ARMY. THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO APPEARS TO HAVE WANED DURING THE YEAR. ANY SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO MACHEL'S LEADERSHIP WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO COME FROM WITHIN THE ARMY, WHICH STILL SEEMS VERY MUCH UNDER CONTROL.

(35) DESPITE RHODESIAN-SUPPORTED DISSIDENCE IN THE NORTH, THE GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO BE IN FIRM CONTROL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THERE ARE POCKETS OF TRIBAL AND REGIONAL DISCONTENT AND SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, INCLUDING SUBSTANTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT IN MAPUTO AND BEIRA AND SOME LABOR DISTURBANCES, BUT THESE DO NOT YET SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE REGIME.

(36) WHILE GOVERNMENT POLICIES ARE STILL BEING ARTICULATED, THEIR BASIC DIRECTION IS CLEAR: MACHEL'S GOVERNMENT WANTS TO ELIMINATE ALL VESTIGES OF PORTUGUESE COLONIAL RULE AND TO CREATE INSTEAD A "REVOLUTIONARY" SOCIETY.

(37) FOREIGN POLICY. BELIEVING ITS MOST SERIOUS THREAT  
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TO BE "IMPERIALISM" WHICH IT DEFINES AS THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES OF WESTERN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES, MOZAMBIQUE HAS ADOPTED A RADICAL, ANTI-WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY. PERCEIVING ITSELF AS HAVING COME TO POWER THROUGH

FORCE OF ARMS, THE MOZAMBIKAN GOVERNMENT SHARES AN AFFINITY WITH OTHER "REVOLUTIONARY" REGIMES AND IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO PROMOTING REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS AROUND THE WORLD. DRAWING HEAVILY UPON MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND THE TANZANIAN EXPERIENCE, MACHEL AND HIS ADVISERS WANT MAJORITY RULE THROUGHOUT AFRICA UNDER LIKE-MINDED REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP.

(38) YET DESPITE HIS STRONG IDEOLOGICAL NATURE, MACHEL CAN BE PRAGMATIC. WHILE DETESTING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, HE CONTINUES TO LET TRANSVAAL GOODS TRANSIT MAPUTO, TO PERMIT MOZAMBICANS TO BE RECRUITED FOR WORK IN SOUTH AFRICAN MINES, AND TO AUTHORIZE POWER FROM THE CATORA BASSA DAM TO GO TO SOUTH AFRICA. HE HAS NOT BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT WESTERN ECONOMIC AID.

(39) RHODESIA IS THE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE OF GREATEST CONCERN TO MOZAMBIQUE. MOST OF THE ATTACKS UPON RHODESIA BY ZIMBABWE GUERRILLAS ARE LAUNCHED FROM BASES ON MOZAMBIKAN TERRITORY AND MOST OF THE ARMS THE GUERRILLAS RECEIVED ARE FUNNELLED THROUGH MOZAMBIQUE. AS A RESULT, MOZAMBIQUE HAS BEEN THE MAIN TARGET OF RHODESIAN RETALIATORY RAIDS WHICH THE MOZAMBIKAN ARMY HAS SHOWN VIRTUALLY NO ABILITY TO PREVENT. NEVERTHELESS, MACHEL HAS NOT WAVERED FROM HIS BASIC CONVICTION THAT MAJORITY RULE CANNOT BE ACHIEVED IN ZIMBABWE WITHOUT ARMED FORCE. AS A RESULT MOZAMBIKAN SUPPORT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD THOSE ZIMBABWEANS WHO HAVE BEEN WILLING TO FIGHT AS WELL AS NEGOTIATE FOR INDEPENDENCE.

(40) IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT MACHEL SEEKS NOT ONLY AN IN-CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPENDENT ZIMBABWE, BUT ALSO ONE THAT IS LED BY A PROGRESSIVE AND REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP SIMILAR TO HIS OWN. IN ORDER TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THIS, HE HAS SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE WHICH WOULD REVOLUTIONIZE THE ZIMBABWE PEASANTS AND WOULD ALLOW TIME FOR A REVOLUTIONARY-MINDED LEADERSHIP TO EMERGE FROM THE FIGHTING FORCES. FOR MACHEL, REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE MAY BE AS IMPORTANT AS LIBERATION.

(41) MOZAMBIQUE HAS PLACED A SPECIAL EMPHASIS UPON ITS RELATIONS WITH "PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST" STATES WHOM IT HAS DECLARED TO BE ITS "NATURAL ALLIES." MAJOR AID AGREEMENTS COVERING HEALTH, AGRICULTURE, AVIATION, EDUCATION, MINING, AND FISHING HAVE BEEN SIGNED WITH THE USSR, EAST GERMANY, ROMANIA, AND BULGARIA. SINCE THE SOVIET UNION INTERVENED ON THE SIDE OF THE MPLA IN ANGOLA, MOSCOW'S PRESTIGE AND STATUS IN MOZAMBIQUE HAVE RISEN SHARPLY, ALTHOUGH A CUBAN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN

PRESENCE IS EVIDENT. THIS WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY MACHEL'S VISIT TO MOSCOW LAST MAY DURING WHICH THE SOVIETS PROMISED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO STRENGTHEN MOZAMBIKAN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

(42) IN DECEMBER 1976 LARGE AMOUNTS OF SOVIET MILITARY

EQUIPMENT, EVIDENTLY PROMISED LAST MAY, BEGAN ARRIVING IN MOZAMBIQUE AND MORE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS REPORTEDLY ARRIVED. IN JANUARY TWO SOVIET WARSHIPS PAID A HIGHLY PUBLICIZED VISIT TO MAPUTO IN A DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE MACHEL REGIME. REPORTS THAT THE USSR WAS CONSTRUCTING NAVAL FACILITIES IN MOZAMBIKAN WATERS PROVED TO BE WITHOUT FOUNDATION, HOWEVER. DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS, AS FIGHTING ALONG THE BORDER WITH RHODESIA HAS ESCALATED AND AS FRELIMO PREPARED FOR ITS THIRD PARTY CONGRESS, THE MOZAMBIKAN GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTY HAVE BEEN DRAWING PUBLICLY CLOSER TO THEIR COM-  
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MUNIST ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE SOVIET UNION. THIS IS MOST APPARENT IN THE APPROVAL GIVEN BY THE FRELIMO CONGRESS FOR THE CREATION OF A NEW MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY.

(43) THUS FAR, THE SOVIETS DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE RECEIVED ANY TANGIBLE BILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE FOR THEIR LARGESSE. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN RECURRING RUMORS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BUILDING A NAVAL FACILITY ON ONE OF MOZAMBIQUE'S OFF-SHORE ISLANDS, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO CONFIRM THIS.

## II. OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

(44) AS REGARDS THE HORN OF AFRICA THERE ARE FOUR MAJOR CAUSES OF INSTABILITY:

--THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION, WHICH HAS WEAKENED ETHIOPIA'S GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, EXACERBATED RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AND INVITED OUTSIDE AID FOR DISSATISFIED ETHIOPIAN MINORITIES;

--THE RESURGENCE OF SOMALI CLAIMS TO SOMALI-INHABITED AREAS OF SOUTHEASTERN ETHIOPIA, NORTHERN KENYA, AND THE FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS (FTAI);

--SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY TO SOMALIA AND NOW, REPORTEDLY, ETHIOPIA;

--QADHAFI'S ABILITY TO ENLIST ETHIOPIAN SUPPORT FOR HIS CAMPAIGN TO TOPPLE SUDANESE PRESIDENT NIMEIRI.

## ETHIOPIA

(45) DOMESTIC SITUATION. ETHIOPIA'S RULING MILITARY COUNCIL IS TRYING TO CARRY OUT AN INTERNAL REVOLUTION, WHILE DEFENDING THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY  
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AGAINST SOMALI AND INTERNAL ENEMIES. THE COUNCIL ITSELF HAS BEEN RENT OVER THE PAST YEAR BY INTERNECINE STRUGGLES THAT HAVE RESULTED IN THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONGMAN--LT. COL. MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM. ETHIOPIAN MILITARY CAPACITY TO COUNTER FOREIGN AGGRESSION IS BADLY STRAINED IN COPING WITH INSURGENCIES AROUND THE COUNTRY'S PERIPHERY:

--IN ERITREA PROVINCE, HALF THE ETHIOPIAN ARMY IS ENGAGED IN A NO-WIN WAR WITH INSURGENTS WHO CONTROL THE COUNTRYSIDE AND ARE NOW THREATENING THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL OF HALF-A-DOZEN TOWNS. AS THE INSURGENCY HAS INTENSIFIED, THE TRADITIONAL ARAB SUPPORTERS OF AN INDEPENDENT ERITREA--IRAQ, SYRIA, THE PALESTINIANS, AND UNTIL RECENTLY, LIBYA--HAVE BEEN JOINED BY CONSERVATIVE ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY SUDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA.

--IN NEIGHBORING TIGRE AND BEGEMDIR PROVINCES, OTHER INSURGENT GROUPS, LOOSELY ALLIED WITH THE ERITREANS, CONTROL SUBSTANTIAL PARTS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE.

--IN SOUTHEASTERN ETHIOPIA, INSURGENTS TRAINED AND SUPPLIED BY THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT POSE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO UNDERSTRENGTH ETHIOPIAN SECURITY UNITS.

(46) FOREIGN POLICY. ETHIOPIA'S TROUBLES MAY INCREASE IN THE COMING YEAR. THE FTAI PORT OF DJIBOUTI--ONE OF ETHIOPIA'S VITAL OUTLETS TO THE SEA--MAY BE THE TARGET OF A SOMALI ANNEXATION ATTEMPT WHEN THE TERRITORY BECOMES INDEPENDENT THIS SUMMER OR FALL. THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED THAT IT WOULD NOT ACQUIESCE IN A SOMALI TAKE-OVER OF DJIBOUTI.

(47) THE BELEAGUERED ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT NEW FOREIGN ALLIANCES IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE ITS OWN SURVIVAL AND TO MAINTAIN THE COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL  
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INTEGRITY. ALTHOUGH ETHIOPIA CONTINUES TO RELY ON THE US FOR MOST OF ITS ARMS, IT IS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS DEPENDENCE, ESPECIALLY AS IT BELIEVES WE PREFERRED A MORE MODERATE SUCCESSOR REGIME TO THE HAILESELASSIE GOVERNMENT.

(48) AFTER TWO YEARS OF IMPORTUNATE ETHIOPIAN REQUESTS

FOR ARMS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, THE ADDIS ABABA REGIME

HAS FINALLY ACHIEVED SOME LIMITED SUCCESS. IN LATE 1976 THE SOVIETS REPORTEDLY AGREED TO SELL ETHIOPIA SOME MODERN WEAPONRY. THE ETHIOPIANS SEE CLEAR ADVANTAGES IN CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES:

--THEY WISH TO DIVERSIFY MILITARILY.

--AN INCREASE IN COMMUNIST, AT THE EXPENSE OF WESTERN, INFLUENCE IS NECESSARY TO REVITALIZE ETHIOPIA'S NON-ALIGNED CREDENTIALS, THUS ENABLING ADDIS ABABA TO COMPETE MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH SOMALIA AND THE ARABS FOR SUPPORT IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS.

--THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES PROVIDE USEFUL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MODELS FOR THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION.

(49) THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE ALSO WORKED OUT AN "ALLIANCE OF OPPORTUNITY" WITH THE LIBYANS. THE TWO SHARE AN ANIMOSITY TOWARD THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS REBUFFED QADHAFI'S OVERTURES IN FAVOR OF A MORE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, AND WHICH HAS NOW PUBLICLY ENDORSED ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE, WHILE PERMITTING ARMS FOR THE ERITREAN INSURGENTS TO TRANSIT SUDANESE TERRITORY. UNTIL ABOUT SIX MONTHS AGO TRIPOLI AND ADDIS ABABA WERE DIVIDED BY THE ERITREAN ISSUE, WHICH QADHAFI PERCEIVED AS A MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN STRUGGLE. NOW, CONFIDENTIAL

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IN RETURN FOR ETHIOPIAN COOPERATION AGAINST NIMEIRI (IN ARMING SUDANESE POLITICAL EXILES IN CAMPS ALONG THE ETHIOPIAN-SUDANESE BORDER), QADHAFI REPORTEDLY HAS HALTED AID TO THE ERITREANS AND PROMISED ADDIS ABABA ARMS.

SOMALIA

(50) SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD IS A BASICALLY CAUTIOUS MAN WHO, UNTIL 18 MONTHS AGO, PUT HIS COUNTRY'S IRREDENTIST CLAIMS WELL DOWN ON HIS LIST OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES. BUT HE NOW BELIEVES THAT ETHIOPIA IS VULNERABLE TO A SOMALI CHALLENGE- HIS ARMY HAS STEADILY INCREASED IN SIZE AND HAS BEEN EQUIPPED WITH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY BY THE USSR.

(51) CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS A GREATER DANGER OF A SOMALI MOVE--EITHER POLITICAL SUBVERSION OR MILITARY ACTION--AGAINST AN INDEPENDENT FTAI, WHICH WOULD BE COORDINATED WITH ESCALATED INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEASTERN ETHIOPIA.



THERE IS ALSO A DANGER THAT THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY, DESPITE ITS CURRENT OVER-EXTENSION, WILL STAGE A

PREEMPTIVE ATTACK ON THE FTAI IF THEY PERCEIVE A SOMALI TAKEOVER IS IMMINENT.

(52) SOVIET PRESENCE IN SOMALIA. THE SOVIETS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO GIVE THE BULK OF THEIR AID TO THE COUNTRY THEY CURRENTLY VALUE THE MOST--SOMALIA, WHOSE PORT OF BERBERA IS THEIR MAJOR INDIAN OCEAN SUPPORT BASE--BUT WILL ALSO TRY TO EXPLOIT THE POSSIBILITIES THEY PERCEIVE IN "SOCIALIST-ORIENTED" ETHIOPIA.

(53) THE SOVIETS PROBABLY REASON THAT:

--MOGADISCIO'S TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET ARMS TO ACHIEVE ITS IRREDENTIST AMBITIONS WILL CURB ANY SOMALI  
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INCLINATION TO EXPEL THE SOVIETS FOR THE TIME BEING. EVENTUALLY, THE SOMALIS MAY SEEK ALTERNATIVE MILITARY SUPPLIERS WITH ARAB FINANCING, BUT A MILITARY SWITCH-OVER WILL TAKE SEVERAL YEARS TO ACCOMPLISH.

--THE ETHIOPIAN ARMS DEAL WILL UNDERSCORE FOR MOGADISCIO MOSCOW'S DISTASTE FOR AN ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI WAR THAT WOULD FORCE THE SOVIETS TO TAKE SIDES (THEY WOULD PRESUMABLY CHOOSE THE SOMALIS, WHILE SEEKING AN EARLY CEASE-FIRE). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY NOT OBJECT TO A SOMALI TAKEOVER OF THE FTAI THROUGH SUBVERSION.

--EVEN THOUGH THE CURRENT ADDIS ABABA REGIME IS UNSTABLE, OVER THE LONGER TERM ETHIOPIA WILL BE THE PARAMOUNT STATE IN THE REGION.

--AN INCREASED SOVIET PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA WILL FURTHER REDUCE US INFLUENCE AND WILL PREEMPT ANY CHINESE ATTEMPT TO BECOME ADDIS ABABA'S IDEOLOGICAL MENTOR.

### III. AFRICA AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD

#### SOVIET POLICY

(54) THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PRESIDENT PODGORNYY WILL BE VISITING TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA IN MARCH VIVIDLY DEMONSTRATES THE USSR'S SUSTAINED HIGH LEVEL OF INTEREST IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. THE VISIT, THE FIRST TO THE AREA BY A TOP SOVIET LEADER (OTHER THAN TO SOMALIA) WILL UNDERSCORE MOSCOW'S INTENTION TO MAINTAIN AND IN-

CREASE ITS VOICE IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS. IT WILL ALSO HIGHLIGHT THE SOVIETS' CLAIM TO CO-EQUAL STATUS IN THE AREA WITH THE US AND WEST.

(55) THE USSR STILL SEES ITS BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR GAINS  
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IN AFRICA AT WESTERN EXPENSE IN THE BLACK-WHITE CONFRONTATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. MOSCOW CLEARLY EXPECTS NO EARLY RESOLUTION OF THAT CONFLICT AND, EVEN IF TENSIONS OVER RHODESIA DIMINISH, BELIEVES WESTERN TIES TO THE WHITE MINORITY WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE AN EASY EXPLOITABLE TARGET. INCREASED SOVIET PROPAGANDA ATTENTION TO THE RACIAL UNREST IN SOUTH AFRICA, FOR EXAMPLE, ALREADY REFLECTS INTEREST IN THE PROSPECTS FUTURE TENSIONS IN THAT COUNTRY MAY OFFER.

(56) THE USSR HAS MEANWHILE MOVED TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH ITS ESTABLISHED CLIENTS IN THE AREA AND TO IMPROVE ITS TIES WITH OTHER STATES. IN SOUTHERN AFRICA THIS IS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN THE USSR'S DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. ELSEWHERE IN THE AREA MOSCOW PUBLICLY OFFERED ARMS AND INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO HELP BOTSWANA IN THE EVENT OF RHODESIAN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IT. INCLUSION OF ZAMBIA ON PODGORNYY'S ITINERARY, MEANWHILE, INDICATES A DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH LUSAKA WHICH HAVE BEEN COOL AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA'S FEARS ABOUT THE GROWING SOVIET ROLE IN AFRICA.

(57) IN THE HORN, THE USSR'S APPARENT AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ETHIOPIA REPRESENTS A MAJOR DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS POLICY. THE KREMLIN EVIDENTLY NOW CALCULATES THAT IT CAN PLAY BOTH SIDES OF THE SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN FENCE WITHOUT SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZING ITS IMPORTANT STAKE IN SOMALIA.

(58) ALTHOUGH MOSCOW UNDOUBTEDLY ENJOYS NIMEIRI'S DISCOMFITURE OVER LIBYAN-ETHIOPIAN MACHINATIONS AGAINST HIS REGIME, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THE SOVIETS HAVE ENCOURAGED THE PLOTTING IN SUDAN. NOR IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE INVOLVED IN THE LIBYAN BACKED COUP ATTEMPT IN JULY 1976. MOSCOW IS  
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ANNOYED AT THE ABRUPT DOWNTURN IN SOVIET-SUDANESE RELA-

TIONS, WHICH HAD SHOWN SOME SIGNS OF IMPROVING PRIOR TO LAST JULY, AND IS ALSO PERTURBED AT NIMEIRI'S SHIFT TOWARD CLOSER TIES WITH EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE WEST. BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE USSR HAS BEGUN TO RETALIATE FOR THESE SETBACKS WITH ACTIVE EFFORTS TO TOPPLE THE NEMEIRI GOVERNMENT.

(59) RELATIONS WITH UGANDA'S IDI AMIN MEANWHILE HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN PATCHED UP. THE SOVIETS REPORTEDLY HAVE NOW REPLACED THE UGANDAN AIRCRAFT LOST IN THE ISRAELI RAID ON ENTEBBE AIRPORT LAST SUMMER. PODGORNYY'S VISIT

TO TANZANIA, FURTHERMORE, WILL ATTEST TO THE INROADS THE USSR HAS MADE THERE AGAINST FORMER CHINESE EMINENCE.

#### CHINESE POLICY

(60) SINCE ITS REENTRY INTO THE AFRICAN CONTINENT IN 1970, WHEN ITS CULTURAL REVOLUTION SUBSIDED, PEKING HAS CONDUCTED A LARGELY SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN TO EXPAND ITS PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN AFRICA. A MAJOR CHINESE OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO LIMIT SOVIET INFLUENCE. SINCE 1970 THE PRC HAS SUCCESSFULLY OVERCOME NEGATIVE AFRICAN MEMORIES OF ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE 1960S WHEN THE PRC SUPPORTED INSURGENT MOVEMENTS AGAINST ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS.

(61) PEKING NO LONGER DEMANDS ACCEPTANCE OF ITS WORLD VIEWS AS A PRECONDITION FOR AID. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN THE MAJOR FOCUS OF CHINESE AID, RECEIVING APPROXIMATELY TWO-THIRDS OF ALL CHINESE FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN 1975. CHINESE ECONOMIC AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA HAS EXCEEDED THAT OF THE USSR.

(62) SOUTHERN AFRICA REMAINS THE PRINCIPAL TROUBLE SPOT FOR PRC AFRICAN POLICY. CHINA STILL REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE  
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NIZE THE NETO REGIME IN ANGOLA, ALLEGING THAT ITS INDEPENDENCE IS DOUBTFUL IN VIEW OF HEAVY SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ITS AFFAIRS. IN KEEPING WITH ITS NON-INTERVENTIONIST STANCE, HOWEVER, CHINA DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO FORCE THIS VIEW ON ITS DIPLOMATIC PARTNERS IN AFRICA.

(63) IN RHODESIA, CHINESE OFFICIALS WORRY THAT ANOTHER ANGOLA-TYPE FIASCO MAY BE IN STORE FOR THEM. THE PRC ORIGINALLY BACKED ZANU, THE ZIMBABWE GROUP WHICH SEEMED TO BE MOST CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE CHINESE MODEL FOR A "PEOPLE'S WAR." WHEN THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS INSISTED ON MERGING ZANU'S ARMED FORCES INTO ZIPA, THE CHINESE

HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO GO ALONG, BUT SINCE THEN CHINA HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY DISTURBED BY CONTINUING CHAOTIC DIVISIONS WITHIN THE MOVEMENT. SOME CHINESE OFFICIALS HAVE CONFESSED THEY ARE NO LONGER CERTAIN WHICH FACTIONS ARE PRO-SOVIET OR ANTI-SOVIET. ALSO, DESPITE CHINESE WARNINGS THAT FIGHTERS SHOULD BE SELF-RELIANT AND BASE THEMSELVES ON THE PEOPLE OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY, THERE HAS BEEN A TENDENCY FOR ZIMBABWE FORCES TO RELY ON A STRATEGY OF CROSS-BORDER RAIDS FROM FOREIGN BASES, MAKING THEMSELVES MORE DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN SUPPLIES AND WEAPONRY WHICH THE USSR IS BEST ABLE TO PROVIDE.

(64) DESPITE PRC UNHAPPINESS WITH CERTAIN DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE FRONT-LINE STATES WITH REGARD TO ZIMBABWE, THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN REASONABLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH TANZANIA, ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA. ON THE OTHER HAND, PRC TIES WITH MOZAMBIQUE WERE STRAINED OVER THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR, AND NOW, WITH MOZAMBIQUE COMING UNDER ATTACK FROM RHODESIA, CHINA'S OPPOSITION TO SOVIET AID COMBINED WITH CHINA'S OWN FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ARMS IS CREATING MORE RESENTMENT IN MAPUTO. PRC MEDIA PROBABLY SIGNALLED CHINA'S DISAPPROVAL OF MOZAMBIQUE'S GROWING RELIANCE ON THE SOVIETS BY IGNORING CONFIDENTIAL

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FRELIMO'S CONGRESS IN EARLY FEBRUARY, DESPITE MACHEL'S TRIBUTE TO MAO AND CHOU EN-LAI IN HIS OPENING ADDRESS.

(65) UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES CHINA MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO WELCOME A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA, BUT PRC PROPAGANDA CONTINUES TO URGE ARMED STRUGGLE. PRIVATELY, PRC LEADERS MIGHT BE RELIEVED TO SEE THE WAR END RATHER THAN CONTINUE TO DEVELOP IN A WAY THAT THE SOVIETS CAN BEST EXPLOIT. THEY ALSO APPEAR AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE AFRICANS IS VERY LIMITED, AND THAT ANY PRC ATTEMPT TO PUSH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PROBABLY ONLY SERVE TO DAMAGE CHINA'S IMAGE AS A MILITANT AND NON-INTERVENTIONIST FRIEND OF AFRICA.

(66) CHINA WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF WARNING AFRICANS AGAINST SOVIET-CUBAN "HEGEMONISM" BUT OF CONTINUING MORAL SUPPORT AND AT LEAST SOME AID EVEN TO THOSE THAT DO NOT HEED ITS WARNINGS. THE PRC HAS FEW, IF ANY, VIABLE ALTERNATIVES.

CUBAN POLICY.

(67) THE CASTRO REGIME CLEARLY CONSIDERS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA TO BE A REGION IN WHICH IT CAN POTENTIALLY EXERCISE A MAJOR INFLUENCE IN ORIENTING REVOLUTIONARY

MOVEMENTS AND INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS ALONG LINES SIMILAR TO THOSE FOLLOWED BY THE CUBAN REVOLUTION.

(68) AT PRESENT, CUBAN STRATEGY IN AFRICA CONSISTS OF:

--EXPANDING DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION;

--PROVIDING ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL COOPERATION TO RECEPTIVE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS;

--OFFERING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS THAT  
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APPEAR TO HAVE GENUINE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS.

(69) CUBA VALUES ITS THIRD WORLD CREDENTIALS AND IS NOT LIKELY TO DIRECT ITS REVOLUTIONARY EFFORTS AGAINST AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH RELATIVELY STABLE AND SOLIDLY-BASED GOVERNMENTS. THOUGH IT MAY, IN SOME CASES, PROVIDE LIMITED FINANCIAL AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT TO IDEOLOGICALLY SYMPATHETIC POLITICAL GROUPS IN COUNTRIES WHERE HAVANA REGARDS THE GOVERNMENT AS REACTIONARY.

(70) CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF CUBA'S TWO-PRONGED FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH HAS ATTEMPTED--FAIRLY SUCCESSFULLY--TO COMBINE LOYALTY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WITH A MAJOR ROLE IN THE THIRD WORLD AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

--SOVIET POLICY PROBABLY DETERMINES THE OUTER BOUNDARIES OF CUBAN OPTIONS IN THE SENSE THAT CUBA WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE AN INITIATIVE DIRECTLY OPPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

--ON THE OTHER HAND, CASTRO PROBABLY COULD NOT BE FORCED TO GIVE MORE THAN TOKEN SUPPORT TO A SOVIET POLICY THAT HE BELIEVED TO BE CONTRARY TO CUBAN INTERESTS.

(71) THE VAST BULK OF CUBA'S MILITARY FORCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REMAIN CONCENTRATED IN ANGOLA. THERE ARE CUBAN MILITARY ADVISERS IN MOZAMBIQUE WORKING WITH MOZAMBICAN DEFENSE FORCES AND/OR RHODESIAN GUERRILLA GROUPS, BUT THEIR NUMBER REMAINS UNCERTAIN. CUBAN TROOPS ARE PRESENT IN MODEST NUMBERS IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA, THE CONGO, GUINEA-BISSAU, GUINEA, AND SOMALIA.

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(72) WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVE CONTINUED THEIR SECONDARY ROLE AT THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCES, SUCH AS CIEC AND UNCTAD. TWO AFRICAN STATES, ZAIRE AND CAMEROON, WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN HAVING THE CIEC MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE POSTPONED FROM LAST NOVEMBER UNTIL SOME TIME THIS SPRING, BECAUSE OF THE BELIEF THAT NOTHING USEFUL COULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN NOVEMBER. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICANS ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO THE MERITS OF THE COMMON FUND, AS OUTLINED IN UNCTAD IV IN NAIROBI.

(73) AT THE 31ST UNGA, NIGERIA WAS THE MOST ACTIVE SUB-SAHARAN MEMBER ON THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WORKING GROUPS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AND DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. ZAMBIA WAS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN

THE NAM WORKING GROUPS ON INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ON THE UN.

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## Message Attributes

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**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MEETING REPORTS, CONSULTANTS, POLITICAL SITUATION  
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**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
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**Review Release Event:** n/a  
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**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA  
**TAGS:** PFOR, XA, XJ, RH, SF, NATO  
**To:** NATO BRUSSELS  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/76e2a1c5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009